In a previous article, I examined the approach to tafsīr and methodology of al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101) as articulated in the introduction to his al-Tahdhib fi tafsīr al-qur'ān. There, al-Jishumī defines a hermeneutical system comprised of eight categories: Reading (al-qārā‘a‘), Philology (al-ḥiqā‘a), Grammatical Syntax (al-i‘rāb), Structural Composition (al-mawzû‘), Meaning (al-ma‘nī), Occasion of Revelation (al-nuzūl), Evidences and Decrees (al-ahdā‘ al-wa‘lāhā‘), and Messages and Stories (al-akhbār wa-l-qisā‘uš). In the case of the categories of Reading, Philology, Grammatical Syntax, Structural Composition, and Occasion of Revelation, the exegete, according to al-Jishumī, has to adopt and abide by the established consensus of scholars, including the rasm (orthography) of the musḥaf of the codex (muṣḥaf) of the caliph ‘Uthmān. In other words, the exegete is not at liberty to amend or introduce weak or poorly authenticated views on these categories to fit his purpose. Yet, it is in the categories of Meaning, Evidences and Decrees, and Messages and Stories that the exegete demonstrates his prowess and rationality in tafsīr.

Given that the majority of Mu‘tazila exegeses are not extant, we cannot verify if this hermeneutical system is used by all of them. In al-Ṣā‘ūdī al-‘Abbāsī, for instance, al-Rumānī adopts a hermeneutical system made up of five categories: Meaning (al-fā‘ah), Reading (wujūh al-qārā‘a‘), Grammatical Syntax (al-i‘rāb), Evidences (al-dalā‘ā‘), and Decrees (al-‘Abbāsī).

The issues that one can raise relate to the types of presuppositions that guide the Mu‘tazila exegesis of the Qur’an, and whether or not al-Jishumī’s approach and methodology are reflective of the entire Mu‘tazila tafsīr tradition.
This paper is an attempt to focus on these questions by examining the glosses of five Mu'tazila exegetes on Qur'an 3:178. They are by Ibn al-Khallāl al-Baṣrī (d. after 377/988) in Mutashābih al-ṣūrān,2 al-Rummānī (d. 384/994) in Tafsīr al-Jāmi' al-kabīr,3 al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 419/1024) in Mutashābih al-ṣūrān,4 al-Jishmūnī in al-Tahālīḥ,5 and al-Zamakhshārī (d. 558/1164) in Tafsīr al-Kashf al-ḥālī.6 The glosses by Ibn al-Khallāl and 'Abd al-Jabbar come from their books on the ambiguous verses of the Qur'an (mutashābih al-ṣūrān), which deal with a specific class of verses that the Mu'tazila consider ambiguous and therefore requiring proper interpretation to unlock their true meaning. Those by al-Rummānī, al-Jishmūnī and al-Zamakhshārī are taken from their general exegetical works. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to map the Mu'tazila tradition of qur'anic exegesis.

The verse under examination, Qur'an 3:178, reads as follows:

From the onset, one can see that the five Mu'tazila exegetes examined in this paper consider Q 3:178 as requiring serious exegesis. Ibn al-Khallāl and 'Abd al-Jabbar include it in their respective Mutashābih al-ṣūrān, thus labeling it as an ambiguous (mutashābih) verse. Al-Rummānī argues that in order to understand this verse, we need to refer to a clear (mukkamī) one, which indicates that he also considers it as ambiguous. Al-Jishmūnī and al-Zamakhshārī do not state this clearly, but from their discussion it is evident that they too treat it as requiring special handling; in the case of al-Jishmūnī, he does not specifically say that Q 3:178 is an ambiguous verse, but a good part of his section on Q 3:178 is identical to what one finds in al-Rummānī.7

What makes Q 3:178 an ambiguous verse? For one, it is not accompanied with a notice that marks it as such. There must be, therefore, something in the meaning of this verse that alerts the Mu'tazila exegetes to label it as ambiguous. According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, “They (the predestinarians) allege that almighty God declared [in this verse] what proves that he intends from disbelievers to increase in disbelief.” So it is the literal meaning of this verse that alerts the Mu'tazila, or to put it in other words, it is the interpretation that the predestinarians advocate which is unacceptable to the Mu'tazila. So the predestinarians read Q 3:178 to mean:

You should not think it is good for them that We prolong their lives. We prolong their lives in order that they increase in sin. A painful torture awaits them.8

Ibn al-Khallāl sums up how the predestinarians advocate their view:

They [the predestinarians] allege that God informed His prophet [Muhammad] (God's blessing upon him) that His prolonging the lives of the disbelievers is not for something good that He intends for them. Rather, it is for them to become more sinful. So He forbid His prophet (God's blessings upon him) to think it was good for them. This is contrary to the argument of our opponents [the believers in free will], who claim that what almighty God gave to the disbelievers and increased their existence, leisure, and lives were only so that they increase in obedience and do what God has commanded them to do and for something good for them. They contradict God and reject what He made known and stipulated about their condition and description.9

One major thing comes out of this reading of Q 3:178 is that in the view of the predestinarians, God instructs Muhammad that he should not consider it for a good purpose that He prolongs the lives of the disbelievers. Verse 3:178 tells him that the reason for prolonging their lives is so that they commit more sins, thus intensifying the torture that awaits them in the hereafter. God wants that they commit more sins, and they have no choice but to carry out what God had predestined for them. Surely in this case, to argue that prolonging the lives of the disbelievers is intended to give them a chance to repent contradicts, in the view of the predestinarians, God's word.

Let's turn to our five exegetes and see how they deal with Q 3:178. The first issue we encounter in their glosses on this verse is the reading of the verb خَسِينَ. As in many cases in the Qur'an, there are various ways of reading a word. With respect to the verb in question, there are two established readings: خَسِينَ or خَسِين. In the case of the former reading (with the third person prefix 'ي'), the expression خَسِينَ المَلِكَ الْإِلَهِ كِرَاءَةٌ يُعْلَنَ means: Those who disbelieved should not think. But in the case of the latter reading (with the second person prefix 'ي'), خَسِينَ الْإِلَهِ كِرَاءَةٌ means: You (i.e. Muhammad) should not think those who disbelieve. Ibn al-Khallāl reads خَسِينَ, that is as an address to the prophet Muhammad, whereas al-Rummānī, 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Jishmūnī and al-Zamakhshārī consider خَسِينَ as the stronger reading, and the verse as an address to the disbelievers. As noted earlier, al-Jishmūnī identifies Reading (as one of the categories of his hermeneutical system, and al-Rummānī before him did this too. The proper reading of the Qur'an comes up therefore as an important aspect of Mu'tazila tafsīr. The reading of a word not only determines what it means, but also how the entire verse is to be understood.

Al-Rummānī provides an interesting discussion on the reading of Q 3:178. He states that all readers of the Qur'an read خَسِينَ with the prefix 'ي', except Ḥamza ibn Ḥabīb (d. 156/773) who read it خَسِينَ with the prefix 'ي'; the reference here is for the canonical readings of the Qur'an. Al-Rummānī then argues that even though it is correct to read it with 'ي', the 'ي' is the better reading because the verb acts on the second sentence: like al-Jishmūnī, al-Rummānī identifies Grammar as one of the five categories of his hermeneutical system. In other words, al-Rummānī is saying that We prolong their lives for something
good for them is a parenthetical clause, which allows him to read Q 3.178 to mean: Those who disbelieved should not think that We prolong their lives so that they increase in sin. We prolong their lives for something good for them. Al-Zamakhshārī completely agrees with this opinion, and al-Jishūmī lists it as a sound view. What we see in this discussion is the importance of grammar to proper exegesis. This grammatical restructuring of the verse necessitates therefore that it is to be understood as an address to the disbelievers, in the sense that prolonging their lives is not permission from God for them to indulge in sin, but rather it offers a chance for them to repent and mend their ways.

Ibn al-Khallālī linds a serious fault with this restructuring of Q 3.178; as noted earlier, he reads the verse as an address to Muhammad. Two main points are raised by Ibn al-Khallālī against this restructuring of the parts of Q 3.178; incidentally, he ascribes it to an earlier Mu'tazila scholar Abū Ja'far al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854). Ibn al-Khallālī contends that for the argument to stand it would necessitate that the two conjunctions anna (א) in א) and inna (א) in א) be read inna and anna respectively:

He gives two reasons for this. First, the verb in the verse (המשתכ) acts on the conjunction, thus it could only be in the form of anna (that is, לא). If, as al-Iskāfī contends, there is inversion in the verse (taqdim wa-ta'khib), then the second part of the sentence is the object of the verb, which requires therefore that inna must be corrected to anna (that is, ולא תשים דברך אלו עליך כי חרב לך נפשך). Second, when one starts a sentence with this conjunction, which is the way to treat the parenthetical clause as an independent clause, it can only be in the form of inna (א). In other words, the inversion argument would require a modification of the way each of the two conjunctions is read. But the problem with this is that none of the readers of the Qur'an read the verse in the way that the inversion argument would mandate. Equally important, the parenthetical clause cannot modify the grammar of the rest of the sentence, as this reading would also require.

What this examination of Ibn al-Khallālī's rejection of the suggested restructuring of Q 3.178 shows is that he does this on grammatical grounds and because it violates the established canonical readings of the Qur'an. Actually, both al-Rummānī and al-Jishūmī admit that even though it is possible according to the rules of the Arabic language to read the first conjunction as inna, yet, none of the readers of the canonical readings did so; they all read it anna. Al-Zamakhshārī states that Yāhūy ibn Waththāb (d. 103/722) read the two conjunctions precisely in the way that the inversion argument would require. It is clear therefore that this is at most a very weak argument given that the overwhelming consensus is against it. Proper grammar, therefore, comes up as a key issue in Mu'tazila exegesis, even though the end result in the case of Q 3.178 is that the position of Ibn al-Khallālī does not agree with the view promoted by the other exeges, thus reflecting a division among the Mu'tazila regarding the grammatical structure of Q 3.178.

If Grammar and Reading are major categories in Mu'tazila hermeneutics, why then did the other exeges not bother as much about the problem caused by the inversion in the parts of Q 3.178? It seems, and I will come back to this later as well, that the sole justification for arguing that the verse comprises a parenthetical clause, and ignoring the grammatical implication, is to shift the order within the sentence to read: Those who disbelieved should not think that We prolong their lives so that they increase in sin. We prolong their lives for something good for them. In other words, the restructuring of the parts of this verse is mandated by dogma: defending the Mu'tazila doctrine of 'adl (God's justice), one of the tenets of their theological system, which assumes that humans have free will.

Does this mean that Ibn al-Khallālī did not care about the doctrine of 'adl? Does it mean that he understood verse 3.178 to mean: Those who disbelieved should not think that We prolong their lives for something good for them. We prolong their lives so that they increase in sin? The answer is emphatically in the negative. As shown earlier, he ridicules the predestinarians for believing that the verse means that God wants from prolonging the lives of the disbelievers so that they increase in sin. His extensive hermeneutics of this verse provide a compelling argument against the predestinarians and validate not only the Mu'tazila interpretation of this verse, but the doctrine of 'adl as well. Ibn al-Khallālī says:

They [the predestinarians] are to be rebutted that, "You cannot deny that God has shown the invalidity of your argument and the futility of your interpretation when He said: I created jinn and mankind only to worship Me (Q 51.56). Thus He encompassed all of mankind and jinn in the cause of His creating them. He meant by His saying to worship Him the contrary of what you have argued and believed that almighty God prolonged the life of the disbeliever, preserved and gave him protection and good health in order for him to disbelieve in Him and accuse Him falsely. How is it possible that He is enraged by something He wishes and desires, or condemns them for doing that for which He created them and drove them to it! Isn't it the ultimate absurdity and extreme ignorance what you have attributed to your Creator and described your Lord with! May He greatly be exonerated from such abhorrent descriptions and repulsive portrayals."

They are to be rebutted as well that, "How do you refute the argument of your opponents, which is in harmony with almighty
God's word, wisdom, and intended grace and mercy? For He meant by that [verse] to inform about the consequence of the affair of the disbelievers, and that they end in sin and increase [in it] due to their hypocrisy. Almighty God's prolonging their lives is not really prolonging their lives for them to increase in sin. For this is used in the Book of almighty God and in the speech of the Arabs, such as His praised and almighty saying: They set up (false deities) as God's equals to lead people astray from His path (Q 14.30). They actually set up gods alongside God in order to bring them nearer to God (Q 39.3), But since this necessitates going astray, He described them for doing what they have done as if for that purpose [to bring them nearer to God]. Similarly is His saying: Pharaoh's household picked him up to be for them an enemy and a source of grief (Q 28.8). We know that they delighted by picking him up so that he could be [their] son, source of joy, and the apple of their eye. The poet said:

For death mothers feed their babies
and for the destruction that houses are built.

He also said:

We collect our money for the inheritors
and our houses we built for destruction.

But people seek children so that they live, not to die. They collect their wealth for themselves, not to the inheritors. They build their houses to live and reside in them, not to see them destroyed. The poet only meant the ultimate consequence. This issue is so clear that it is not necessary to exert any more effort to clarify it more than that.

The validity of our argument is therefore proven, namely that the intention of almighty God in this verse is to inform His prophet, God's mercy upon him, about the consequence of their [the disbelievers'] affair, that they will not benefit from the prolonging of their lives, and that they will only increase in error by it and obsession to commit offenses and indulge in sins. No one who knows the language of the Arabs and how they express themselves argues for the invalidity of this [view].

This extensive discussion by Ibn al-Khallâl shows that his interpretation of Q 3.178 hinges on the exegesis regarding the particle li in (yôrûd). If it is taken to mean intention (al-trâdû), then, in Ibn al-Khallâl's mocking tone,
The Scholarship of tafsîr

Al-Zamakhshari comes to the same conclusion, but ignores the issue around the exegesis of the particle li. He says,

If you ask: “How is it possible that His prolonging their lives in order to increase in sin is the objective of almighty God?” I would say: “It is the cause for prolonging their lives, but not every cause has an objective. Don’t you see that you say, ‘I did not participate in a warring raid due to weakness and neediness,’ and ‘I left the country to avoid vice,’ even though none of that (weakness, neediness, vice) is your objective. Similarly is the increase in sin, it is the cause and purpose for prolonging their lives.” If you ask: “How could the increase in sin be the cause for prolonging their lives in the same way as weakness is the cause for not participating in war?” I would say: “Since in God’s knowledge, which encompasses everything, they will increase in sin, the prolonging of their lives happens and is a purpose for it [increase in sin] by way of metaphor.”

So it is clear that, for al-Zamakhshari, We prolong their lives so that they increase in sin is a metaphorical expression that must not be taken literally and as reflective of God’s purpose. His purpose is “for them to repent and become believers.”

A final point regarding the exegetes examined in this paper is that they consider exegesis to be a battlefield, where they fight opponents over their misinterpretations of the Qur’ân. So, exegesis for the Mu’tazila is not a passive process in which the exegete simply proposes the meanings of the Qur’anic verses. Rather, it is an opportunity to reinforce one’s position and point out the fallacies in the beliefs of his opponents. As seen in their respective discussion, Ibn al-Khallâl and ‘Abd al-Jabbâr are obsessed with the misinterpretation of the predestinarians. Al-Jishmi, too, remarks that Q 3.178 is “evidence that the belief of the compulsionists regarding the created being is false.” And even though al-Rummanî and al-Zamakhshari do not directly address the predestinarians, there is no doubt that their words reflect clear awareness about what the proponents of predestination advocate and how to answer them.

Conclusion: understanding Mu’tazila tradition of Qur’anic exegesis

The five exegetes examined in this paper agree on several aspects relating to the approach and methodology with respect to Qur’anic exegesis. They also disagree on other aspects. But what is evident for all of them is that exegesis of the Qur’ân is informed and governed by a hermeneutical system that is applied to the verses to disclose their correct meaning. This hermeneutical system involves proper reading, grammar, and other aspects that relate to the verification of the text. Some exegetes, such as al-Rummanî and al-Jishmi, do identify this hermeneutical system, but the others noticeably adopt it without stating so in their introductions.

One can infer from their respective views that the exegete is not at liberty to propose readings or restructure the text without their being documented in the codex (mushaf) of ‘Uthmân or its canonical variations. Even in instances that allow the exegete to bring out a meaning that perfectly accords with the doctrines of the Mu’tazila, he still has to justify it on the basis of a canonical precedence. As we saw earlier, Ibn al-Khallâl rejects the restructuring of the parts of Q 3.178 because it violates all established traditions (be it grammar or reading) about this verse. And even though al-Rummanî and al-Jishmi advocate the view about the restructuring, they admit that none of the readers changed the conjunctions (innalainmu) as it would be required if one assumes there is inversion in the verse and the middle sentence is a parenthetical clause.

But there is more than a hermeneutical system that informs the Mu’tazila approach and methodology in Qur’anic exegesis. Tafsîr has to produce for a given verse a meaning that is rational and does not violate the tenets of the Mu’tazila theological system. If the meaning goes against their theological system, it cannot be rational. This is best summed up by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, as noted earlier, who says, “We reject that [God] intends to disbelieve and all other offenses.” In other words, the tenets of adl and ravî‘îd require that God is just and cannot do what is absurd. Subsequently, if a verse implies something that the Mu’tazila categorically reject, the verse is labeled as ambiguous and the tool of their hermeneutical system is applied to it in order to bring out a meaning that agrees with their assumptions. Again, these tools could not be applied in such a way to introduce novelties in the text of the verse (be it reading, grammar, structure composition, or philology).

In this respect, it is not surprising to see that the Mu’tazila insist that exegesis is a serious duty. The exegetes are under taklîf, as al-Jishmi states in his exegetical gloss on Q 3.7.16 or as al-Zamakhshari puts it in his introduction that authoring an exegesis of the Qur’ân “is on the same par as the personal obligation (fard al-ayn).” It is in this way that we can explain the variation among the five exegetes examined in this paper. Even though we find the same approach and methodology in tafsîr, and in some cases close similarities between texts, these are not indications of passive borrowing. Rather, similarities are actually instances where later exegetes agree with the views of earlier exegetes. So we understand better why Ibn al-Khallâl felt at liberty to tear apart the view of his predecessor al-Iskâfî. Each exegete has to come to exegesis well equipped with what the task entails in terms of knowledge and tools, to produce meanings that are governed by a hermeneutical system and rationality, and that are not at variance with the Mu’tazila’s theological tenets.
THE MU'TAZILA AND THEIR TAFSIR TRADITION

Appendix

A. Ibn al-Khattāb al-Baṣrī (d. after 377/988), Kitāb al-Radd `alā al-jabrīya
The text of section Q. 3:187 is edited on the basis of manuscript Cunctani 332 of Ibn al-Khattāb's Kitāb al-Radd `alā al-jabrīya al-qadariya fina ta'allaqī bih mm mutatahilah āy al-qur'ān al-arabīn, folios 36a–38a.

We cannot help but observe the following: {A} ḥaṣibun ‘adād ilā ‘aṣām ilā ‘ādām al-‘ārām (120).} This is a simple calculation of al-‘ārām, and the [measures his] faith. Indeed, it is not possible to measure faith, as it is a concept that cannot be quantified.

And what the Muʿtazilah have added {is that} al-‘ārām is not just a simple calculation of faith, but rather a measure of the individual's faith. It is a concept that cannot be quantified, as it is a complex idea that cannot be measured.

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We cannot help but observe the following: {A} ḥaṣibun ‘adād ilā ‘aṣām ilā ‘ādām al-‘ārām (120).} This is a simple calculation of al-‘ārām, and the [measures his] faith. Indeed, it is not possible to measure faith, as it is a concept that cannot be quantified.

B. Al-Rumānī (d. 384/994), al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr
The section on Q. 3:178 is edited on the basis of manuscript Bibliothèque Nationale 6523 of al-Rumānī’s al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, folios 147b–149a.

In the verse, the Qur’ān states that the wolf [is] a symbol of those who reject the guidance of the Messenger and his companions. It is a warning against those who seek to mislead others and are misguided themselves. It is a reminder to all of the importance of following the guidance of the Prophet and his companions.

The verse is a call to remember the guidance of the Messenger and his companions and to follow their example. It is a warning against those who reject this guidance and their companions. It is a reminder to all of the importance of following the guidance of the Messenger and his companions.
THE SCHOLARSHIP OF TAFSIR

The scholars of Tafsir have made significant contributions to the understanding of the Quran. Their interpretations have been influential in shaping Islamic thought and practice. This page contains a discussion of the scholarship of Tafsir, exploring various aspects of the field.

THE MU'TAZILA AND THEIR TAFSIR TRADITION

The Mu'tazila were a school of thought within Islam that sought to reconcile faith with reason. Their approach to Tafsir reflected their belief in the importance of rational inquiry in understanding the divine revelation. This section of the text delves into the Mu'tazila's contributions to the study of Tafsir.

Notes


2. On the basis of manuscript Fondazione Cieutani Ms. 332 (Rome, Italy) of Ibn al-Khallâlî's Kitâb al-Ka'Rîdî 'ala al-ja'bîrîyâs al-qadarîyâs fînâ Allah la'âshî dînî ha'dîn mutasâlîhî dîr al-ka'rîn al-kârîn.

3. On the basis of manuscript Bibliothèque Nationale Ms. 6523 of al-Rummânî's al-Jâmi' al-kabîr.


5. On the basis of the three manuscripts of al-Jishmî's al-Tahdhib fi tafsîr al-qrân: Ambrosiana Library F184 (Milan, Italy), al-Jâmi'-al-kabîr/Unayza #5 (Şan'à, Yemen), and Al al-Hûthîmi Private Library (Sâ'dâ, Yemen).


7. This is one possibility that points to the dependence of al-Jishmî on al-Rummânî. But it also could have been the case that they both relied on the same source. I have underlined the text from al-Jishmî on Q. 3.178 in the Appendix the material that corresponds to that in al-Rummânî.
THE SCHOLARSHIP OF TAFSIR

وقالوا: "لا يوجد فروع ولاء للعرفان، ولكن لا يوجد موضع يطلق عليه إلا حرية وحرية علقت إلا مؤرخًا.

ونقلت، لا يوجد أن تحلل ، "أطلالًا وليف" على الألفام من معرفة النافذة في الإضاءة، إلا أن كثيرًا من المؤرخين يطلقون عليه، وهم ثلاثة: تدفق الرمل ودعمه، ودائم المصلحة. وهم ثلاثة:

أ) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

B) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

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G) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

H) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

I) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

J) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

K) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

L) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

M) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

N) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

O) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

P) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

Q) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

R) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

S) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

T) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

U) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

V) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

W) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

X) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

Y) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

Z) وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال". وقيل: "أنه لم يقال".

THE MU'TAZILA AND THEIR TAFSIR TRADITION

D. Al-Hākim al-Jishshim (d. 494/1010), al-Tahdhīb fi tafsīr al-qurūn

The text of Q. 3,178 is edited using three manuscripts of al-Jishshim’s Tahdhīb: Ambrosiana F184 (A), folios 126a–126b, ‘Unayza #5 (U), folios 80b–81b, and Al-hāshimī (H), folios 113b–114b. A dates from Ramaḍān 702/May 1303, and H dates from Sha’bān 697/May–June 1298. U does not have a date, but must be roughly from the same period as A and H. (I have underlined the parts in al-Jishshim’s text that are identical to al-Rummāns.’)

قرآن تعالى: َلَوْ كَانَ الْبَيْنَ الْأَغْلَابِ يَضْعَفُتُهُمْ َفَلَوْ كَانَ الْبَيْنَ الْأَغْلَابِ يَضْعَفُتُهُمْ (180) َوَلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (181) َوَلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (182) َوَلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (183)

القراءة

قرأ ابن كثير وءابرو حفص: ُلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (180) َوَلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (181) َوَلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (182) َوَلَا يَخْسَحَ الْذِّنِينَ يَخْسَحُهُمْ (183)

اللغة


الإعجاز: لأجل الإعجاز، وتجوز في الجملة، يكون الدلالة في القرن الذي يأتي للدلالة في القرن الذي يأتي للدلالة في القرن الذي يأتي للدلالة.

المعنى

ثم ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن، إنما ينتهي إلى أن.
8 Below are two modern translations of this verse:

  The disbelievers should not think that it is better for them that We give them more time: when We give them more time they become more sinful – a shameful torment awaits them.

  And let not those who blaspheme imagine that by deferring punishment We are doing them a favour; rather, We so defer them that they may increase in sin. Abusing torment awaits them.

9 For the Arabic text, see the Appendix.
10 Al-Jashush ascribes this position to Abū Bakr al-Asāmm (d. 201/817).
11 Although Yahyā ibn Watthāb was a known reader of the Qur'an, his reading is not one of the seven canonical ones, and does not even feature in the extended ten canonical readings. Al-Zamakhshārī seems desperate for a precedent.
12 Al-Farrā’ (d. 207/822), for instance, lists both views as acceptable: al-Farrā’.
13 Al-Jashush (d. 207/822), for instance, lists both views as acceptable: al-Farrā’.
15 Al-Jashush has it: "But intending what is morally repulsive is morally repulsive."
18 A: (عَلَى) is missing.
19 A: (بَيْنَ) is missing.
21 A: (عَلَى). A: (عَلَى) is missing.
23 A: (عَلَى) is missing.
24 A: (عَلَى) is missing.